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ABSTRACT: Stephen Stich has criticized the possibility of providing a legitimate set of norms for
reasoning, since such norms are justified via reference to pretheoretical intuitions. I argue that
through a process of perspicuously mapping the belief sphere one can generate a list of intellectual
virtues that instrumentally lead to true beliefs. Hence, one does not have to rely on intuitions since
the norms of reason are derived from factual claims about the intellectually virtuous agent.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this paper is to argue that the intellectual virtues can be the ground, or
foundation, for argument norms. This position is formulated as a response to a
position developed by Stephen Stich. Stich has criticized the possibility of providing
a universal and legitimate set of norms for reasoning, and therefore argument, on
the grounds that such norms are justified via a reference to pretheoretical
intuitions. These pretheoretical intuitions, according to Stich, are too variable and
therefore cannot provide a legitimate set of rational norms. In response to Stich I
will argue for a causal theory of such norms. More specifically, I will rely on Martha
Nussbaum’s method of perspicuously mapping different spheres of human
experience to generate a set of rational norms. The specific sphere to be mapped is
the doxastic, or belief, sphere. The idea is that through mapping this sphere one can
generate a list of intellectual virtues, or character traits, that reliably and
instrumentally lead to true beliefs. One would not have to rely on intuitions, and
therefore Stich’s criticism could be avoided, since the ground for claims concerning
norms of reason would be grounded in empirical data; i.e. through observation of
those traits that reliably and instrumentally lead to true beliefs. With such a
position, then, the norms of reason, or argument, would not rest in language but
instead in the intellectually virtuous agent. I will begin the development of this
position with a consideration of Stich’s criticism.
2. STICH’S CRITICISM
EPISTEMOLOGY

OF

REFLECTIVE

EQUILIBRIUM

AND

ANALYTIC

Stich formulates his criticism in a book called The Fragmentation of Reason. The
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-7.
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specific target of his criticism is a position developed by Nelson Goodman who,
according to Stich, attempts to “ground an account of the justification of cognitive
norms in an analysis or explication of the common sense notion of justified
inference” (Stich, 1993, p. 75). The process that Goodman endorses for identifying
justified valid inferences, either deductive or inductive, is called a process of
reflective equilibrium. It is a process where one can determine the rules of valid
inferences by checking them against accepted practices of valid inferences. More
specifically, we check them against judgments about specific inferences and then
generate our rules on the basis of these specific judgments. We can then employ the
rules generated in this way to pass judgment on future specific inferences. Goodman
admits that this process appears somewhat circular. We come up with rules by
consulting specific sanctioned inferences and then we use these rules to assess the
validity of other specific inferences. How Goodman addresses this charge of
circularity is by proposing that it is a virtuous, and not a vicious, form of circularity.
This is because both rules of inference and specific inferences themselves are
deemed justified by “being brought into agreement with each other” (Goodman,
1965, pp. 66-67). It is a delicate process where we make “mutual adjustments
between rules and accepted inferences” to generate agreement between the two
(Goodman, 1965, pp. 66-67). This is why it is called a process of reflective
equilibrium, as it involves a reflective process where one attempts to generate
agreement between rules and accepted inferences. And, according to Goodman, this
is all the justification that is required for our rules of valid inference (Goodman,
1965, pp. 66-67). Even further, Stich interprets this position offered by Goodman to
be definitive of justification. That is, justified inferences simply are those inferences
that pass the reflective equilibrium test. So the reflective equilibrium test, according
to Stich’s interpretation, does not merely provide good evidence for the claim that
certain inferences are justified, but instead is constitutive of justification.
Consequently, Goodman’s reflective equilibrium test would seem to fulfill an
important role in determining the norms of argument as any inferences that pass
that test determine what justification is (Stich, 1993, p. 78).
Of course, the circularity of this process may be enough for many to reject it. I
will not focus on this criticism, though, but instead Stich’s criticism of Goodman’s
position. One thing I would like to note before setting out Stich’s criticism is that he
makes a distinction between cognitive norms and the rules of logic, and his main
concern is with the former. Stich thus admits that Goodman’s position can be
interpreted as an attempt to identify the rules of logic and not cognitive norms, but
Stich proposes that he will interpret it as an account of the latter. Although I will not
defend this claim right now, but possibly in discussion after, I will to some extent
reject this distinction. That is, I do not accept a sharp distinction between the rules
of logic and cognitive norms. I admit that not all cognitive norms are grounded in
valid argument forms, as I interpret the intellectual virtues as psychological
dispositions and yet also cognitive norms, but it seems quite plausible to me that
any inference deemed valid within logic should be included on our list of legitimate
cognitive norms; or norms of thinking that people should adopt. I will, of course,
offer some remarks on the relationship between cognitive norms and the rules of
logic later in the paper (Stich, 1993, p. 78). For now, let’s turn to Stich’s criticism of
2
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this position offered by Goodman.
Stich offers a two-prong attack; one prong directed specifically at Goodman
and the other at what he calls analytic epistemology in general. The first prong,
directed at Goodman specifically, proposes that it is quite possible that if we
engaged in the reflective equilibrium test we would have to accept as justified
inferences certain inferences that are obviously unjustified. Stich cites the gamblers
paradox as an example – or the illegitimate inference that the more times one does
not role a seven increases the probability of rolling a seven with the next throw of
the dice. This inference is unjustified, but nonetheless it is typically sanctioned by
most people when they are engaged in the process of reflective equilibrium. Hence,
it passes the test of reflective equilibrium and should be considered a justified
inference. Of course, those who we can call experts in the analysis of inferences
would not want to count such an inference as justified but how can we dismiss it as
a unjustified inference if reflective equilibrium is the only test we have (Stich, 1993,
pp. 83-86)? It is a possible solution to this problem that then leads to the other
prong of Stich’s criticism which is directed at analytic epistemology in general.
The proposed solution to the problem of sanctioning illegitimate inferences
involves conceptual, or linguistic, analysis, and ultimately reference to what are
called ‘pretheoretical intuitions’ concerning rules of justification. Stich considers
such a procedure to be definitive of analytic epistemology, and he claims that it is an
irrelevant failure (Stich, 1993, pp. 90-91). The main problem, which already may be
obvious, is relativism. That is, if the method to be employed to identify legitimate
inferences is reference to ordinary language, and our pretheoretical intuitions
concerning justification, then it is always possible that divergent, and possibly
incompatible, justification rules will emerge. That different linguistic communities,
when consulting their language and supposed pretheoretical intuitions, will come
up with completely different sets legitimate inferences. This result is not very
reassuring, since it appears that favouring any one set justified inferences is simply
the result of cultural, or linguistic, bias. One would have no grounds to dismiss the
merits of conflicting lists of justified inferences, since they would result from the
same justificatory process as one’s own (Stich, 1993, pp. 90-93). They also appear to
be the only means by which we can determine justification, according to Stich’s
account of analytic epistemology, so that divergent sets of justification rules would
be equally justified; even if they contradict one another. Such a procedure would
therefore not get us very far in identifying, or establishing, a legitimate set of
argument norms, unless one wants to embrace relativism. I would feel
uncomfortable with such an embrace, and hence I will attempt address Stich’s
criticism by consulting a position developed by Martha Nussbaum and apply it to
the identification of intellectual virtues. I will then propose that these intellectual
virtues, or various aspects of intellectual character, can provide a foundation for
argument norms.
3. NUSSBAUM’S METHOD OF PERSPICUOUS MAPPING
Nussbaum derives her position for virtue identification from Aristotle. She proposes
that Aristotle did not limit himself to simply offering an account of what is good for a
3
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human life on the whole, but also sets out what would be considered appropriate for
specific spheres of human experience. What the process of virtue identification
involves is first identifying some sphere of human experience which all human
agents typically encounter, and then setting out the proper way to act within that
sphere. Examples of such spheres include: “Fear of important damages esp. death,”
“Management of one’s personal property, where others are concerned,” and
“Distribution of limited resources” (Nussbaum, 1998, pp. 261-262). Nussbaum
refers to these spheres of human activity as ‘grounding experiences.’ Faced with the
‘grounding experience’ one can then discern what would be the best way to
respond, and, according to Aristotle, this usually involved adopting some virtue that
is a mean between a deficiency and an excess. The above examples would entail
courage, generosity and justice respectively (Nussbaum, 1998, 261-263). It is
therefore the sphere of experience, or the grounding experience, which fixes the
range of evaluation. It limits the choices one can make, and through analysis of that
sphere, or grounding experience, one can determine the best way to act; i.e. identify
specific virtues.
To accomplish this task, Nussbaum continues, we first offer a ‘thin,’ or
‘nominal,’ definition of what is appropriate to the particular sphere – the term
‘courage’ would be an example of such a nominal definition – and then, through a
‘perspicuous mapping’ of the grounding experience, we can move on to give a more
precise indication of what is required to act appropriately within the sphere of
human experience. The virtues then emerge as the most appropriate
motivations/dispositions for people to have once the sphere of experience has been
‘perspicuously mapped’ (Nussbaum, 1998, pp. 263-263, 269)
4. THE DOXASTIC SPHERE, INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE AND ARGUMENT NORMS
This method advocated by Nussbaum could then be employed in an attempt to
identify the intellectual virtues. This could then allow one to avoid relying on
pretheoretical intuitions to provide a set of universal argument norms in the
following way. First, we identify the appropriate sphere of human experience, which
in this case, I propose, would be the doxastic, or belief, sphere. Then, through a
perspicuous mapping of the doxastic sphere we can determine which psychological
dispositions, or virtues, are conducive to the formation of true beliefs, and which are
conducive to false beliefs. Those dispositions that are conducive to the formation of
true beliefs we would identify as intellectual virtues and those conducive to false
beliefs as intellectual vices. The intellectual virtues would then represent the
standards of excellence associated with the doxastic sphere, since they facilitate the
acquisition of true beliefs. The constituents of intellectual character would therefore
be derived, at least in part, from the observation of actual human agents and their
belief forming habits, and not through consulting pretheoretical intuitions. Through
reflection on the doxastic sphere we would thus have empirical input from a nonculturally specific sphere of experience, i.e. the doxastic sphere.
The list of intellectual virtues that emerge from this perspicuous mapping
could then provide the foundation for arguments norms. This is because such
virtues are identified as truth-conducive, and therefore would facilitate the
4
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identification of argumentative structures that are themselves truth-conducive. That
is, via her intellectual character the intellectually virtuous agent would be able to
identify which argument structures are conducive to truth in particular contexts. It
could be the case that the argument structures, or norms, could vary from one
context to another, but this flexibility would not be perceived as problematic since
the intellectually virtuous agent and the doxastic sphere would be the sources of
stability in the process of identifying argument norms.
Of course, it may be possible for Stich to apply his criticism of relying on
pretheoretical intuitions to this position. The application would likely runs as
follows. Stich proposes that the problem of relying on pretheoretical intuitions to
identify argument norms is simply that these intuitions can vary greatly since they
are cultural products. That is, they are derived from different cultural practices, and
as cultural practices vary so too will pretheoretical intuitions about appropriate
reasoning processes (Stich, 1993, pp. 90-93). Similarly, then, Stich could argue that
any attempt to identify certain virtues as truth-conducive will depend heavily on the
beliefs of a particular culture. As cultures vary so too will their list of truthconducive psychological dispositions or intellectual virtues. So one culture may
identify being open-minded as an intellectual virtue, on the grounds that such a
virtue leads to true belief, while another culture may hold behaviours such as
deference to authority and dogmatism to be intellectual virtues for the same reason.
Consequently, the introduction of the idea of mapping the doxastic sphere would
not solve the problems of Stich’s original criticism, according to this argument, and
cannot provide a universal set of argument norms.
In addressing this possible criticism offered on Stich’s behalf it must be first
acknowledged that a lot of its sting can be removed by explicating further the claim
that the identification of the aspects of intellectual character occurs through a
perspicuous mapping of the doxastic sphere and is not the result of an unreflective
acceptance of shared, or common sense, intuitions. A significant aspect of Stich’s
original criticism is that rational norms are to some extent identified via an
unreflective acceptance of inherited intuitions which result from cultural
transmission (Stich, 1993, pp. 90-93). But the process of identifying those character
traits on our list of intellectual virtues, outlined above, does not entail the
unreflective acceptance of inherited intuitions. Such virtues are not identified by
consulting the desires, or intuitions, of agents, nor even various cultural practices; at
least not exclusively. Instead the sphere of experience, or the grounding experience,
provides significant input for identifying which traits are truth-conducive. Thus, in
this case, it would be the doxastic sphere that would limit the choices one can make
regarding which traits make the list or not, and it is through analysis and
observation of this sphere, or a perspicuous mapping of it, that one determines
those traits that are intellectual virtues. In this way, as Nussbaum proposed,
progress in our understanding of what is virtuous is analogous to progress in our
scientific understanding of the world, since through our perspicuous mapping of
grounding experiences we come to formulate a more accurate and fuller
specification of the types of problems human agents encounter and the appropriate,
or virtuous, ways to respond to such problems (Nussbaum, 1998, pp. 263-264). The
focus is therefore on actual human experiences and not on simply explicating
5
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shared, or inherited, intuitions. Such a process is also reflective, since the
perspicuous mapping of the doxastic sphere will entail critical engagement with that
sphere in order to determine which traits actually facilitate true belief. Quite
generally, then, the doxastic sphere provides something independent of both human
intuitions as well as cultural practices which can be analyzed to determine which
character traits would make the list of intellectual virtues.
Of course, as noted, divergent communities may identify different traits as
intellectual virtues, which then appears to make the identification of the aspects of
intellectual character relative to specific cultures. This possibility must be admitted,
but it does not necessarily preclude the possibility for either consensus or accuracy
to be achieved in regard to which traits are intellectual virtues. Since we are not
relying on inherited intuitions to identify which traits are intellectual virtues, but
rather reflection upon the empirical input of the doxastic sphere, there is the
possibility that relativism could be removed and both consensus and accuracy in
our list of intellectual virtues achieved. Such consensus and accuracy is especially
possible if the agents who are attempting to identify truth-conducive character
traits are sincerely attempting to be intellectually virtuous. This is because the agent
who sincerely attempts to become intellectually virtuous will desire truth for its
own sake. And such a desire should then compel the agent to not favour those traits
identified by her community, but rather favour achieving true beliefs. This favouring
of true beliefs, if it is sincere, should then also lead the agent to be open to changing
the list of intellectual virtues if some trait is discovered not to be truth-conducive.
So, the intellectually virtuous agent would not unquestionably defer to some other
authority, whether it is a class of scholars or some text, but instead take care to
ensure that such deference is actually truth-conducive. If it is not truth-conducive,
then the intellectually virtuous agent should not attempt to habituate such a
disposition. Unless a reason for holding that relativism is inevitable in such a
situation can be provided, then this possible objection from Stich is not really a
problem. This is simply because, in principle, such relativism could be removed and
both consensus and accuracy achieved for our list of intellectual virtues through a
perspicuous mapping of the doxastic sphere; especially if members of the
community are sincerely attempting to be intellectually virtuous. It would assuredly
not be an easy task to achieve such consensus, but it does not appear to be
impossible in principle.
5. CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper has been to argue for a shift away from the focus on language
when determining the norms or argument and to instead focus on the intellectually
virtuous agent. The presumed goal of argument is to achieve true belief, and the
claim is that by mapping the doxastic sphere truth-conducive virtues can be
discovered that could then be relied on to guide agents when they are engaged in
the process of offering and developing arguments. In order to display the merits of
such a position a criticism of the attempt to derive argument norms, offered by
Stephen Stich, was consulted and addressed. It was proposed that reliance on
unreflective intuitions can be avoided if we instead focus on the doxastic sphere and
6
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perspicuously map it to identify truth-conducive virtues. There are still a lot of
details to work out with such a position, but hopefully what has been presented here
has displayed some of its initial merits.
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